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A tropical depression formed over the southeastern
Bahamas on 23 August 2005,moved toward the Gulf
of Mexico, and strengthened to category 5 on the
Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale over the central
Gulf of Mexico (NCDC 2005). When hurricane
Katrina made landfall on the Louisiana coast with
category 3 intensity on 29 August 2005, 130mph of
sustained winds breached the levees of New
Orleans and caused substantial inundation.A flood
following the storm, devastated the Crescent City,
and the disaster was recorded as the costliest natur-
al disaster ever in US history, resulting in an 80 per-
cent flood in the City of New Orleans and over
1,800 casualties (Louisiana Geographic Information
Center 2005).
The repercussions of hurricane Katrina (and hurri-
cane Rita that happened soon after) continue until
today and beyond into the future. However, most of
the efforts now are focusing on housing provision,
social reconstruction and community development.
Of course, these have an economic impact, but this
paper primarily focuses on the business interruption
impacts, soon after the disaster.
Prior to hurricane Katrina, the three costliest natur-
al disasters in terms of dollar magnitude of damages
recorded in the United States were the drought in
1988 with estimated losses of over 39 billion US dol-
lars, hurricane Andrew in 1992 which cost 30 billion
US dollars and the Northridge earthquake in 1994
which resulted in over 44 billion US dollars
(National Research Council 1999). 9/11, a manmade
disaster, was of similar magnitude.
Covering the first year after the disaster, several
studies on its economic impacts were completed.
However, most of this research was from govern-
mental reports mainly focusing on the direct losses
or on speculations about future impacts on the area.
Louisiana received federal reimbursements for loss-
es of about 105 billion US dollars (Kent 2006).
Nordhaus (2006) based an analysis on the economic
impacts from US hurricanes since 1950 and came up
with an estimate of 81 billion US dollars for hurri-
cane Katrina.
However, the total (direct, indirect and induced)
economic losses were higher than these estimates, in
part because of the interdependence between eco-
nomic sectoral activity and household consumption.
Park et al. (2006a) estimated the direct and indirect
economic losses because of the inoperability of the
Port of New Orleans in the seven months after the
hurricane as 62.1 billion US dollars. Of course, the
sectors that rely heavily on waterborne commerce
were more severely affected,although all major eco-
nomic sectors were negatively impacted during the
storm and recovery period.
It is useful to examine other economic losses in the
region.Several oil and gas refineries were shut down
for more than a week. 115 offshore oil platforms
were missing, sunk, or went adrift. One-half of 
1.3 million evacuees from the New Orleans metro-
politan area were not able to return in the first
month after the storm, and many key workers were
away for much longer (Katz et al. 2006).
The Energy Information Administration (EIA
2006a) released a report analyzing historical impacts
of tropical cyclones on Gulf of Mexico crude oil and
natural gas production over the period 1960 through
2005, and refinery operations over the past 20 years.
The analysis showed that tropical storms and hurri-
canes in the Gulf area typically cause seasonal dis-
ruption of shut-in production of 1.4 percent for
crude oil and 1.3 percent for natural gas compared to
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wells on the Outer Continental
Shelf (OCS). However, these
averages are skewed upwards by
the 19 percent of oil production
and 18 percent of natural gas
production that was shut in dur-
ing 2005. Also, the Government
Accountability Office (GAO
2006) released a report address-
ing the factors causing natural
gas price increases,influences on
consumers according to the
higher prices, and the adequacy
of roles of federal government
agencies played in ensuring nat-
ural gas prices competitive. In
September 2005, natural gas
spot prices increased to over 15
US dollars per million BTUs,
which is roughly twice as high as
the average price in July of that
year.The skyrocketed price resulted from a substan-
tial portion of domestic supply disruption and exces-
sive demand because of colder weather than expect-
ed (ibid). In research of economic losses because of
the employment changes, a report of Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS 2006) presented the impacts of
Katrina on employment in the Gulf coast area by
examining over-the-year changes. Employment in
the most severely affected parish in Louisiana was
down by nearly 40 percent in September 2005 com-
pared to a year before. Colgan and Adkins (2006)
discussed the proportion of employment and wages
of the affected industries defining them as ‘ocean
industries’. Including oil and gas exploration as well
as marine transportation and
related goods and services, the
ocean economy of the region
encompassing Florida,Alabama,
Mississippi, Louisiana and Texas
employed 291,830 people in
wage and salary jobs paying
nearly 7.7 billion US dollars for
the wages in 2004.
Figure 1 shows the severe im-
pacts of two hurricanes (Katrina
and Rita) on oil and gas produc-
tion platforms on the coast of
the Gulf of Mexico, where the
inoperability of gas and oil
industries severely affected the
US national market because crude oil production as
well as petroleum products in the area accounted for
nearly three-fifths of the total US output in this sec-
tor in 2004 (EIA 2006b).
Not surprisingly, the Gulf of Mexico offshore instal-
lations have a significant place in the US oil and gas
industries such that the domestic gasoline price esca-
lated significantly right after the two storms.Figure 2
indicates the fact that the effects of the hurricanes
were not confined to the area. The total volume of
production for the entire US shows an abrupt drop
in September 2005.The flow parallels the Gulf coast
flow while the rest of the US shows a relatively
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steady trend. In other words, the rapid decrease in
petroleum production of the United States from
September 2005 mainly resulted from reduced pro-
duction in the Gulf coast.
Crude oil industries in the Gulf region are closely
related to port activity.The analysis conducted by
Park et al. (2006a) addressed disruptions of port
activity, including oil industries. This study, how-
ever, focuses on the oil-refinery industries of 
the Gulf of Mexico by subtracting foreign and
domestic exports from the total output of oil
refineries.
The Gulf of Mexico region is defined as PADD III
(Texas Inland, Texas Gulf Coast, Louisiana Gulf
Coast, North Louisiana-Arkansas and New
Mexico) shown in Figure 3. This requires spatial
aggregation by modifying our National Interstate
Economic Output Model (NIEMO), to 47 regions
from the original 52 (including the rest-of-the-
world) regions. The next section illustrates our
approach to estimating direct impacts required as
input data for the 47-region NIEMO, and applying
what we call the Flexible National Interstate
Economic Model (FlexNIEMO).
Input-output models have been applied to the prob-
lem of economic impact estimation for many years.
In recent years,our group has developed and applied
IO models that include substantial spatial disaggre-
gation. Most decision makers are interested in local
effects and our models can estimate these. Our
National Interstate Economic Model (NIEMO) is a
multi-regional input-output model for the 50 states
and the District of Columbia. Both models provide
results for 47 industrial sectors (labeled the USC
Sectors). NIEMO has a supply-side as well as a
demand-side capability.In applications to hypotheti-
cal or actual port closures, for example, the loss of
exports is best modeled via the demand-side
NIEMO, whereas the loss of imports is modeled via
the supply-side NIEMO.
This type of model is most useful for short-term
impact analysis because buyers and sellers can be
expected to eventually make substitutions in light
of the price changes that follow longer-term major
disruptions. Omitting these effects is a well-known
limitation of the IO approach. Here, we describe
how to use post-event information on concurrent
demand and value-added changes to identify the
technological (production function) changes that
occur after a major disruption. We compare these
results to the estimates from the baseline NIEMO
to show the detailed impacts of substitutions and
adaptations.
As seen in Table 1, Louisiana experienced an eco-
nomic decline (by 1.5 percent) in the years 2004 to
2005.According to BEA’s data, except for Louisiana
and Alaska, all the other states grew in terms of
Gross State Product.Also, the mining sector includ-
ing oil and gas production was the most negatively
impacted component of GDP.
Methodologies
The Holt-Winters time-series
approach was used to estimate
normal economic trends, if the
hurricanes had not occurred.
These estimates provided the
direct impacts necessary for
input data into the demand-side
NIEMO. We then used the
FlexNIEMO to construct month-
to-month supply-side versions of
NIEMO.
The Holt-Winters approach to
estimating the normal economic
status using times-series metho-
dology is described in several
recent articles (Park et al. 2006a;
Park et al. 2006b; Richardson et
al. 2007; Gordon et al. 2007).The
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gradually over time,based on data for previous peri-
ods and exponentially declining weights. Based on
the estimated coefficients, the forecast oil-refinery
industry values are obtained at the end of 2005
(August to December) and for first three quarters of
2006. Direct impacts are calculated from the differ-
ence between the actual and predicted production of
oil-refinery activities.
Second, FlexNIEMO was used to construct monthly
versions of the supply-side NIEMO. The approach
developed by Park et al. (2007b) allows the fixed
coefficients in the input-output world to be continu-
ously modified, reflecting previous economic events
and interindustry substitutions. Because oil-refinery
products are important to supporting the economy
in the Gulf of Mexico and the United States,the sup-
ply-side NIEMO approach is helpful. One problem
is how to adjust the supply-side model to reflect
demand-side adjustments during the recovery peri-
od. The analysis combines the demand-driven
NIEMO described in Park et al. (2007a) with the
supply-side NIEMO in Park (2006). This solution
overcomes some of the major shortcomings inherent
in the IO model.The model aggregated 52 regions to
47 regions, because the Gulf of Mexico corresponds
to six states, and treated the Gulf of Mexico as one
region. Therefore, the newly defined NIEMO has
(47x47)x(47x47) different coefficients for each
month (August 2005 to September 2006) after hurri-
cane Katrina for 47 regions and 47 sectors.
Results
Figure 4 shows the 13 months of forecasts using the
Holt-Winters method, which is adjusted monthly.
The R-Square is 87 percent and Theil’s U statistic
which summarizes the forecasting accuracy show
0.071. Because the U statistic is close to 0 and the U
of no predictive power is 1 (Theil 1966; Maddala
1977), the forecasts are statistically acceptable.
The analysis here has concentrated on the total busi-
ness interruption impacts of the hurricanes on the
dominant sector (oil refining) by using a multire-
gional input-output model (NIEMO). These
amounted to 8.28 billion US dollars in the first year
after the hurricanes; even in September 2006 actual
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Table 1  
Contributions to Percent Change in Real GSP, 2004–2005 
State and region  US Southeast Louisiana
Agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting  – 0.05  – 0.01  – 0.05 
Mining  – 0.04  – 0.12  – 1.66 
Utilities 0.01  0.00  –  0.07 
Construction 0.13  0.27  –  0.07 
Durable goods manufacturing  0.40  0.37  – 0.04 
Non-durable goods manufacturing  0.08  0.08  0.48 
Wholesale trade 0.07  0.13  – 0.04 
Retail trade 0.20  0.32  0.03 
Transportation and ware-housing  0.11  0.11  0.02 
Information 0.34  0.40  0.14 
Finance and insurance 0.54  0.54  0.22 
Real estate, rental and leasing  0.32  0.67  – 0.41 
Professional and technical services 0.48  0.47  – 0.13 
Management of companies 0.01  0.04  0.05 
Administrative and waste services 0.21  0.32  0.19 
Educational services 0.01  0.01  – 0.02 
Health care and social assistance 0.33  0.34  – 0.08 
Arts, entertainment, and recreation  0.02  0.03  – 0.05 
Accommodations and food services 0.13  0.17  0.00 
Other services 0.06  0.06  – 0.06 
Government 0.18  0.41  0.07 
Total 3.60  4.60  –  1.50 
Notes: Real GSP is adjusted based on 2000 dollars. The Southeast region includes Alabama, Arkansas, Florida,
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia and West Virginia.
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis.CESifo Forum 2/2010 77
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output remained below estimated output from a
forecasting model. Using the other variant of the
model (FlexNIEMO) which allows for input substi-
tutions in response to changes in relative prices, the
total impacts fall to 4.85 billion US dollars.As for the
state-by-state impacts, not surprisingly, most
occurred in the Gulf states – more than 92 percent.
Similarly, because oil refining has few interrelation-
ships with other sectors, almost all the sectoral
impacts (98.04 percent) are restricted to the oil sec-
tor.The primary policy implication from the analysis
is that the business interruption costs from the hurri-
canes (and from the more recent Gulf oil spill) pro-
vide an upper threshold on how much policymakers
might pay to prevent and/or mitigate similar events.
The difference in the results from an application of
NIEMO and an application of FlexNIEMO are dra-
matic.The original model estimates an overall multi-
plier of 1.83 while the new results indicate a much
smaller multiplier, 1.07.
Impact modeling using widely available input-output
approaches routinely includes the caveat about the
fixed technologies assumption and how that over-
states the estimated results.We have adapted a new
and operational multiregional input-output model of
the US NIEMO, to analyze substitutions and have
considered their scale and scope for the case of oil
and gas refinery losses in the Gulf of Mexico follow-
ing hurricanes Katrina and Rita in late 2005. The
results suggest that a detailed study of substitutabili-
ty is useful because overstated impacts from the
application of conventional IO are substantial.
NIEMO generates millions of multipliers that
remain to be explored at the individual sector level,
by month, sector and region. This is in the tradition
of input-output structural de-
composition analysis (see Rose
and Casler 1996).
Recent developments
Prior to the Gulf oil spill of April
2010, New Orleans was finally
beginning to recover.This paper
does not deal with the most
recent events, but this New York
Times  quotation (7 May 2010)
offers a good summary: “since
the Saints won the upon the
backdrop of Mardi Gras, fol-
lowed by the landslide election
of a popular new mayor, New Orleans had been, by
all accounts, getting its groove back. Five years
removed from hurricane Katrina, the tangible signs
of a real recovery are everywhere: in rebuilt homes
and refurbished parks, in old restaurants come back
to life and in new businesses thriving”. The conse-
quences of the oil spill are still unclear, especially in
terms of its impact on seafood and tourism, but
appear to get worse day by day. Only 20 percent of
the seafood Americans eat is domestic,but most of it
comes from either Alaska or Louisiana. The shrimp
industry alone, which produced 90 million pounds in
2008, brings in 1.3 billion US dollars a year.
Other issues
Although this paper primarily focuses on the short-
term (typically 2005–2006) economic impacts of the
hurricanes, especially as they affected the dominant
industry of oil refining, there are some other policy
issues that merit attention, even if briefly.
One important item is the reconstruction of the lev-
ees in New Orleans by the US Army Corps of
Engineers. Presumably because of budget con-
straints, they are rebuilding only to category 3 hurri-
cane standards.This makes little sense because a cat-
egory 5 hurricane is possible, even likely at some
time. A related problem is the lack of back-up elec-
tricity generators for the pumping stations. The fail-
ure of these was a primary factor in the severity of
the flooding.
Yet another problem is the defects in the insurance
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Figure 4scale of hurricane Katrina made the defects in cata-
strophe insurance obvious. There needs to be a
major shift to risk-based premiums, an incentives
scheme to encourage firms and households to invest
in mitigation measures,and to deal with equity issues
via some kind of subsidy program but not by subsi-
dizing insurance premiums.
The housing issue which has still not been resolved is
critical because it has affected the lives of so many
people.More than 200,000 structures were damaged,
most of them because of severe flooding resulting
from the levees. Of these structures, well more than
one-half were housing units, about evenly split
between owner-occupied rental housing (approxi-
mately 67,000 of each). According to the US
Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD), 71.5 percent of the occupied units in
Orleans Parish (the city) were damaged and
41.9 percent were severely damaged or destroyed.In
the five most impacted counties 305,000 units were
damaged, i.e. 65.1 percent of the occupied housing
stock, and 22 percent were severely damaged or
destroyed. In New Orleans itself only 3 high-lying
neighborhoods out of 14 avoided severe damage to
rental housing and not a single neighborhood
(Bostic and Molaison 2008).
Housing damage was the primary factor explaining
the population loss of the City of New Orleans from
458,000 prior to Katrina to a post-Katrina low of
137,000 four months later. After that, it began to
recover but slowly and still remains below its peak.
The population loss was not confined to the city
alone. Population declined in other parishes outside
the city,in one case – St.Bernard Parish – even more
than in New Orleans itself (by 80 percent in the first
six months compared with 60 percent in New
Orleans itself – see Bostic and Molaison 2008). Not
surprisingly, the situation stimulated a surge in
repair, reconstruction and new construction and an
inundation of workers, many of them Latino. The
associated demand of non-resident workers for
rental accommodation made the housing problem
even worse.
As for tourism (the second most important sec-
tor), Mardi Gras made a partial recovery in 2006.
Some of the parades were cancelled (six fewer
parades in Orleans Parish, with an average of
three fewer floats on each parade) and hotel occu-
pancy rates were about 25 percent below the festi-
val rates in 2005 (Deloughery 2008). In March
2006, hotel and restaurant employment was about
70 percent of the pre-Katrina level. Nevertheless,
the comeback was quite surprising. The explana-
tion was that the high-lying French Quarter
escaped serious flood damage, although some
hotels and restaurants were damaged by wind and
activities were impeded in the short run by power
outages and other inconveniences. Attendance in
the last weekend of the 2006 Mardi Gras was
70 percent of the 2005 level (about 700,000). In
2007,it was about 100,000 more.By 2010,however,
all three major festivals (Mardi Gras, the Essence
and Jazz Festivals) achieved record attendances.
As suggested above, it is unclear whether these
performances will be repeated in 2011 because the
short-term future of seafood production (that
plays such an important role in New Orleans
tourism) is in doubt as a result of the new disaster,
the Gulf oil spill of April 2010.
Conclusions
This paper’s primary focus has been the economic
impacts of hurricane Katrina (and,to a lesser extent,
Rita) in the first year aftermath. From then on, the
emphasis was on social and economic reconstruction
and recovery. Of course, these had economic
impacts. A common argument in both natural and
manmade disaster discussions is that such disasters
are over time a ‘wash’ because the positive subse-
quent recovery impacts more or less balance out the
negative initial disaster impacts. However, the prob-
lem with this approach is that it neglects the oppor-
tunity costs of the resources used in the recovery
efforts. The implication is that including recovery
activities among the favorable economic impacts
associated with a disaster is misleading, if not down-
right wrong.
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